University of Michigan Law School

University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository
Articles

Faculty Scholarship

1987

Economics and Law: Two Cultures in Tension
James Boyd White

University of Michigan Law School, jbwhite@umich.edu

Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/articles/2090

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/articles
Part of the Law and Society Commons, and the Legal Profession Commons

Recommended Citation
White, James Boyd. "Economics and Law: Two Cultures in Tension." Tenn. L. Rev. 54 (1987): 161-202.

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at University of Michigan Law
School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Articles by an authorized administrator of
University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
mlaw.repository@umich.edu.

ALUMNI DISTINGUISHED LECTURE
IN JURISPRUDENCE
ECONOMICS AND LAW: TWO CULTURES IN
TENSION
JAMES BOYD WHITE*

I want to preface my remarks by saying something about the
kind of talk this is going to be. As my title says, I shall speak mainly
about economics and law, which I shall examine as forms of thought
and life, or what I shall call cultures. With law, about which in fact
I shall speak rather briefly, I am naturally familiar by training and
experience. But with economics I am familiar only as an observer
as a general reader who reads the newspaper, as a lawyer who has
followed a little of the law and economics literature, and as one who
has lived among those interested in the field. I thus speak about it
as an outsider, and, as you will see, I speak largely about features
of economic thought that I find disturbing. What I say, then, should
be taken as tentative, subject to correction and response from those
who know what I do not. In this sense the work I am offering you
is unfinished. On the other hand, it does reflect a good many years
of thinking about these questions, and it says what I think. It is
tentative, then, not in the sense that I do not mean what I say, for
I do, but in the sense that I recognize that about much of this I
might someday have to change my mind.

• Hart Wright Professor of Law, Professor of English Language and
Literature, and Adjunct Professor of Classical Studies, The University of Michigan.
I wish to thank Bruce Ackerman, Wayne Booth, Thomas Eisele, Robert Heilbroner,
Alan Hyde, Arjo Klamer, James Krier, L.H. LaRue, Howard Latin, Richard
Lempert, Daniel Lucich, Donald McCloskey, Alfred McDonnell, Robert Nagel,
Richard Posner, Antonius Robben, Joseph Sax, Cass Sunstein, Terrance Sandalow,
Frederick Schauer, Joseph Vining, Mary White, Michelle White, and Stephen Wil
liams for helpful comments on an earlier draft. None of them is of course responsible
for what I say here.
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ECONOMICS AND THE WAY WE THINK

To say that I shall speak about "economics" may be somewhat
misleading, for I shall actually focus my attention on only one branch
of it, namely microeconomics of the neoclassical kind. This is the
economics of the "Law and Economics" school-the economics that
is proposed as offering a solution to the problems of choice inherent
both in the law and in public life more generally-and it is perhaps
the dominant mode of thought among other economists as well. (It
is the hope of many macroeconomists, for example, to be able to
rest their work on a microeconomic foundation.) To use "economics"
to refer to this branch of the field, as I do, may be a solecism, but
for a lawyer in the 1980's it is an easy and perhaps forgivable one,
since this is the terminology generally used by those who have been
most energetic, and successful, in recommending this mode of thought
to us. I

1. The work that established law and economics as a generally visible field
was RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (1973). For an introduction
to the methodology of microeconomics see DONALD N. MCCLOSKEY, THE APPLIED
THEORY OF PRICE (2d ed. 1985). This is a particularly valuable book because the
author is highly critical of the "scientific" claims of economics, but nonetheless
devoted to it as a method. See also DONALD N. MCCLOSKEY, THE RHETORIC OF
ECONOMICs (1985).

A useful attempt to locate the way modern economists think and talk more
globally, especially in their disagreements, is ARo KLAMER, CONVERSATIONS WITH
ECONOMISTS (1983). For a recent book that locates economic analysis in the context
of a particular kind of capitalist economy, and subjects both to intelligent criticism,
see ROBERT L. HEILBRONER, THE NATURE AND LOGIC OF CAPITALISM (1985). An
interesting attempt to apply the reasoning of economics to the "non-economic" use
of one's time is found in S.B. LINDER, THE HARRIED LEISURE CLASS (1970);
In addition, the reader may find the following references of use: ISAAC D.
BALBUS, MARXISM AND DOMINATION (1982); GARY S. BECKER, THE ECONOMIC APPROACH TO HUMAN BEHAVIOR (1976); MARK BLAUG, THE METHODOLOGY OF ECONOMICS (1980); STEPHEN GUDEMAN, ECONOMICS AS CULTURE: MODELS AND METAPHORS
OF LIVELIHOOD (1986); RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMICS OF JUSTICE (1981,
MARSHALL SAHLINS, CULTURE AND PRACTICAL REASON (1976); E.F. SCHUMACHER,
SMALL Is BEAUTIFUL: ECONOMICS As IF PEOPLE MATTERED (1975); T. SCITOVSKY,
THE JOYLESS ECONOMY: AN INQUIRY INTO HUMAN SATISFACTION AND CONSUMER
DISSATISFACTION (1976); BARRY SWARTZ, THE BATTLE FOR HUMAN NATURE: SCIENCE,
MORALITY AND MODERN LIFE (1986); Symposium on Law and Economics, 85 COLUM.
L. REV. 899 (1985); Ackerman, Law, Economics, and the Problem of Legal Culture,
1986 DUKE L.J. 929; Kelman, Choice and Utility, 1979 Wis. L. REv. 769; Kennedy,
Cost-Benefit Analysis of Entitlement Problems: A Critique, 33 STAN. L. REV. 387
(1981); Leff, Economic Analysis of Law: Some Realism About Nominalism, 60 VA.
L. REv. 451 (1974); MacNeil, Bureaucracy, Liberalism, and Community - American
Style, 79 Nw. U.L. REv. 900 (1985); Michelman, Norms and Normativity in the
Economic Theory of Law, 62 MINN. L. REv. 1015 (1978); Mishan, The Folklore of
the Market: An Inquiry into the Economic Doctrines of the Chicago School, 9 J.
ECON. IssUEs 681 (1975); Priest, The New Scientism in Legal Scholarship: A
Comment on Clark and Posner, 90 YALE L.J. 1284 (1980); Reder, Chicago Econom-
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But this branch of economics is interesting and important for
reasons that extend beyond its own merits or demerits, for it exemplifies, in a rather pure and distilled form, certain larger dispositions
of thought that are reflected as well in other forms of economics, in
certain branches of political science, and in contemporary social
thought both academic and popular. While at one level, then, I take
my subject to be the kind of microeconomics I shall mainly speak
of, and my audience to be the lawyers and judges to whom this kind
of economics is offered as a model of thought, at another I wish to
speak about certain deeper features of our general culture, to an
audience more generously defined. Indeed my most important aim
today is to draw your attention to certain features of our culture,
certain habits of thought and expression that are so natural to us
that they may seem to be a part of nature itself, not cultural at all.
But cultural they are, and my questions are how to identify, how to
understand, and how to judge this part of our common life.
To put it another way, I think that neoclassical microeconomics
rests upon a broad base in our culture, to which it owes much of its
intelligibility and appeal. It reflects a general view of human nature
and human reason, of community and the world, that goes back at
least to Bentham, and that underlies, in the law, the traditions we
call Sociological Jurisprudence and Legal Realism, as well as Law
and Economics. More immediately, the ground for what we now call
an "economic" view of law was laid by those academics of the
twenties and thirties who, seeing that legal questions involved questions of policy as well as of rights, began to speak as though all legal
questions were simply policy questions, and by those Supreme Court
opinions, somewhat later in time, that began to resolve cases by
"balancing" one "interest" against another, thus engaging in a crude
form of the kind of cost-benefit analysis that is the grammar of
modern economics.
What is more, certain versions of the kind of thought I seek to
identify are present not only in the law but in our public, political,
and philosophical discourse more generally, and have been for a long
time. Among philosophers the maker of the modern tradition in this
respect I think is Hobbes, and this in two ways. First, in the famous
opening paragraph of Leviathan he says that man is the creator of
his social and political world in exactly the same way that God is the
creator of the natural world and of man. This claim of human
possibility, enormously important and liberating in its time, has a
depreciated modern version that is our current dogma, namely that

ics: Permanence and Change, 20 J. EcoN. Lrr. 1 (1982); Tribe, Technology Assessment and the Fourth Discontinuity: The Limits of Instrumental Rationality, 46 S.
CAL. L. REv. 617 (1973); Williamson, Intellectual Foundations: The Need for a
Broader View, 33 J. LEGAL EDUC. 210 (1983).
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"we" can make ourselves and our world be whatever "we" want, a
view that underlies much of the field of policy studies, of which
economics is a branch. While economics has in some ways resisted
these claims, insisting on the necessity of costs and the reality of
scarcity, in a deeper sense its promise is similarly utopian. Second,
Hobbes established a method of reasoning about social life that is
still with us, and of which economics is perhaps the most fully
elaborated form, namely that of using the models of mathematics.
Once our terms are defined with sufficient precision, all thought can
be reduced to a kind of calculation: for Hobbes, to what he calls
subtraction and addition, and for the moderns, to forms of mathematical analysis that are more complex but that rest upon the same
fundamental assumptions. Hobbes-or a part of him; there is also
the side that Leo Strauss made so much of, which is prudential and
Thucydidean in character-thus forms a surprising and powerful
alliance with Bentham, in other ways so different, for both think
that language can be made transparent and that all intellectual activity
can be reduced, or elevated, to a single form of thought.
In a sense, then, we are all, among other things, "economists"
now, and have been so for a long time. My questions are what this
has meant, what we can make it mean, and what we can keep it
from meaning.
My own view is that there is a deep conflict between the sort of
economics that is most often recommended to us as lawyers and the
intellectual and social practices that have characterized American law
from the beginning. I think, therefore, that we should not accept the
invitation to convert our legal culture-or at a more general level
our political culture-into an economic one, as many urge, but
vigorously resist it.
The development of this position is the aim of my talk as a
whole, and I shall say no more about it now except to observe that
I shall criticize the culture of economics, and defend the culture of
law, in part on political grounds. When I speak of politics I do not
mean Democrats vs. Republicans or anything like that, but I do
mean to suggest that modern economics of the sort I shall talk about
is imbued with largely unrecognized ethical and political implications,
many of which in fact have wide currency; that these can be analyzed
and criticized as such; and that the same is true of law as well.
Indeed it could hardly be otherwise, for whenever we talk, we commit
ourselves to views of the world, of human nature-of ourselves and
our relations to others-that entail or enact a kind of politics. This
is in fact true of the talk I am giving right now, and it is partly as
an ethical and political text, in the expanded sense I am giving those
terms, that I wish it to be judged.
II.

ECONOMICS

AS A TOTAL CULTURE

As a way of working out my position I wish to engage in a kind
of thought-experiment, an act of the imagination, in which we ask
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what things would be like if the language of this sort of economics,
and the habits of perception, feeling, and thought that it realizes,
were our only language, our only habits. Economics, after all, is a
way of imagining the world and we can ask what life would be like
on the terms it provides: Who are the actors in this universe, with
what relations to each other and to the natural world? In what social
and intellectual practices do they engage? What possibilities for
meaning-for community, for self-understanding, for art-what motives for action, what conceptions of happiness are enacted in this
discourse? What, in short, would things be like if economics were
our total culture?
I propose this experiment partly because some practitioners of
economics seem to want to make it our total culture, and this is a
way of thinking about what they offer us; but more importantly as
a way of making visible the nature and consequences of certain habits
of mind and expression that are integral to economics and in more
attenuated ways have a place deep in the minds of all of us. My
object is not to make the world turn in horror from what economics
has to teach, or economists turn in horror from themselves-unlikely
scene-but to identify certain dangers against which we, and they,
should be on guard, to expose what it is we start to commit ourselves
to when we think or speak in these ways. The idea is not that
economics should be obliterated, but that it should be understood
for what it is and placed in a proper relation to other languages, to
other cultures, of quite a different kind.
When I speak of the "dangers" of a particular language or
culture, I point to nothing peculiar to economics but to a condition
of all life, all language. Think, for example, of the language of the
computer, or of arms control, or of medicine, or of the institution
where you work: what would it mean to use that language to construct
a whole world? What total culture would it make? As some of you
know, this is the question I asked about law in The Legal Imagination, 2 and it could be asked of any discipline, any specialized set of
linguistic and intellectual practices. Here I propose to ask it about
economics. I am interested in what happens to one's mind and self
as one increasingly comes to speak the language of economics, and
in the nature of the world, and the community, that this talking
makes.
Some would no doubt respond that nothing happens to the mind
or to the community, that language is only a tool, and that economics
does not make a culture but only adds to our knowledge in certain
ways. Language no more affects the individual mind than the use of
a hammer or a saw might do. Language is, or can be, purely
instrumental; we look through it to the real world that it describes

2.

J. WMTE, THE LEGAL IMAGINATION (1973).
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or manipulates. I think that is not right either as to language or as
to tools, that in important ways we become the languages we usethe language of computer analysis or military domination or economics-and that our habitual practices, whether with computers or
jackhammers, rifles or flyrods, help to make us what we are, both
as individuals and as communities.
In making this investigation, then, I start from the position that
the languages we speak, and the cultural practices they at once reflect
and make possible, form our minds by habituating them to certain
modes of attention, certain ways of seeing and conceiving of oneself
and of the world. This is, in fact, why we learn them. Of course I
do not mean that every lawyer or doctor or economist or engineer
or baseball scout or harbor pilot is the same as every other. The case
is quite the reverse, for in each instance the full art of the life in
question involves the assertion and mobilization of what is individual
in the actor. But it is true that the language and practices of a
particular professional (or other) culture create many of the conditions upon which that part of life will be led, and that these conditions
are much, though not completely, the same for everybody within it.
A second premise, related to the first, is that all cultural and
linguistic systems have limits and lacunae, aspects of life that they
leave out or distort. Languages function as resources that are relatively well adapted to some purposes, to some forms of life, badly
to others. There is no such thing as a language that does everything,
for whatever can be done by the languages it excludes are of necessity
excluded from the world it creates and the practices it validates.
For me the major art of intellectual life is accordingly to discover,
and to try to control, the ways in which our languages capture and
drive our minds, so that we may recognize what they leave out or
distort, both in ourselves and in others, subjecting them to the
discipline of other forms of thought and expression. Control of such
a kind is most difficult, for it is at heart a species of self-control:
when we speak our languages we cannot help believing them; we
cannot help participating, emotionally and ethically and politically,
in the worlds they create and in the structures of perception and
feeling they offer us. In time the soldier wants to go to war.
Many people think of economics solely as a scientific, conceptual,
and cognitive system, apparently unaware that there are any other
dimensions of meaning in economic talk. But all expression is loaded
with values, ethical and otherwise; all expression defines a self and
another and proposes a relation between them; all expression remakes
its language; in these senses all expression proposes the creation of a
community and a culture. All expression, in short, is ethical, cultural,
and political, and it can be analyzed and judged as such. To claim
that economics is a science is perhaps to claim that it cannot be
judged in such terms. But "sciences" are cultures too, with their own
created worlds and values. One way to describe my aim in this talk,
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then, is to say that it reverses the usual flow: we are used to economic
analyses of this or that aspect of our common life-voting, the
family, war, etc. I propose here to begin what I would call a
rhetorical or cultural analysis of a certain kind of economics.
As I said earlier, I shall speak mainly of neoclassical microeconomics, but shall occasionally consider more popular forms of thought
as well; and at the end I shall widen the lens considerably to include
tendencies far more broadly conceived. The reader will notice that I
do not take a particular text or person as representative of the field
of economics or any of its subfields, nor for the most part do I cite
particular writers on particular points. This is not an oversight. My
concern is with structure and tendency rather than detail, and I am
not interested in engaging in disputes about the representative character of a particular passage, text, or mind. Instead, I invite the
reader to check what I say against what he or she knows of the ways
this kind of economics works, the ways it is offered to us as a model,
and the ways in which it is connected to larger or more widespread
habits of mind and feeling. Rather than making a case that is meant
to stand or fall by the degree to which the unwilling are compelled
to assent to it, as a lawyer or a scientist might, I mean to present a
set of reflections, I hope in their own way persuasive, to be tested
against the reader's own.
III.

EcONOMICS

AS A LANGUAGE OF THEORY

Neoclassical microeconomics proceeds upon certain assumptions
that can be summarized this way. The universe is populated by a
number of discrete human actors, each of whom is competent,
rational, and motivated solely by self-interest. External to the human
actors is a natural universe that affords what are called "resources,"
which are acted upon by human actors to create something called
"wealth." Partly for reasons of practicality, this kind of economics
defines economic activity, and hence wealth, in terms of the process
of exchange by which one actor exchanges some item within his
dominion for an item within the dominion of another, or, far more
commonly, for money which is the medium of exchange. To look at
everything from the point of view of exchange is, naturally enough,
to regard the universe as a collection of items for potential exchange,
and in this sense to itemize it. When an exchange takes place these
items enter the economic system and become part of what we mean
by productivity. Where no exchange actually takes place-as where
wealth is created and consumed by the same person, or where leisure
is chosen over work-the economic effect of the actor's decision is
not disregarded by professional economics, as it often is in popular
economic thought, but it is still measured by the value of an imagined
exchange, the one the actor has forgone. The central principle of the
system is that everything is at least hypothetically interchangeable
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and thus of necessity quantifiable in ways that permit meaningful
commensuration, at any rate by the actors who are faced with the
choices to which economics speaks.
As the natural- universe is itemized by these real or imagined
exchanges, the social world is atomized, conceived of as a set of
actors of equal competence, without race, gender, age, or culture.
Each actor is assumed'to be motivated by an unlimited desire to
acquire or consume.' Since each is interested only in its own welfare,
each is in structural competition with all the others. This in turn
creates a severe scarcity with respect to the resources. Where there is
no scarcity, as there once was not with respect to clean air or water,
there can be no economics of this kind. The final ingredient is money,
a medium in which surplus can be accumulated with convenience
and, in principle, without limit. So far as possible, all human
interaction is reduced to the single model of exchange. Economics is
the study of what life would be like on such assumptions.
Exchange is a method of determining value, which, tautologically,
is said to be the price for which items are sold. This is the value that
is put upon them by the economic system, and the only kind of value
that economics can express. Obviously individuals may put different
values on different items-indeed, this is ordinarily necessary for the
exchange to occur in the first place-but although these private values
drive the economic system, they are not directly expressible in its
terms.
In the world of economics individual actors function according
to what economists call "rationality." This is a reasoning process
that consists of identifying items of potential consumption or dominion in the world, calculating their value in dollar or other common
terms, and then estimating various kinds of positive and negative
risks. Reason is thus reducible to calculation and risk assessment.
This is, of course, a drastically reduced conception of reason. Compare, for example, the eighteenth-century view of reason as the
intelligent and wise response to all the conditions of human and
external nature, as the full attainment of intellectual maturity and
wisdom. The economists' conception of the kind of reasoning that is
at work in the world they describe or imagine is reinforced by the
kind of reasoning they engage in themselves, which is 4 logical and
deductive in nature, and in its own way equally narrow.
3. I speak here of total desire. Economics of course recognizes the declining
marginal utility of particular items of consumption. And economics does not limit
this desire to material goods, but includes whatever acquisitions will make the actor
happy. But in this system happiness is quantified on the assumption that every actor
wants the "most" that he can get and this is to speak of human life as acquisition
or domination, not as development or growth. For discussion of the consequences
of this line of thought, see generally LINDER, supra note 1, and SCITOVSKY, supra
note 1.
4. At least this is what they claim. For a different view see DONALD N.
McCLosKEY, THE RHETORiC OF EcONOMICS (1985).
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A.

A Hypothetical Discourse?

Such is the image of social life used as the theoretical structure
for economic analysis. One common and not very surprising response
of the non-economist is to claim that this picture is simply false
because it does not accurately and completely reflect the processes of
social life as we know them. People do not in fact conceive of or
organize their lives in this way: they are not fundamentally or
exclusively self-interested, they have values other than those of acquisition and dominion, and they reason in ways that are far more
complex and multidimensional than economics suggests they do, and
than economists themselves do.
To this the economist gives answers of two general kinds. The
first is to say, "No, of course it does not reflect the truth of social
life as one experiences it. We know that human beings are not social
atoms or discrete agents, that they are not always rational in the
sense that we mean it, that they are not wholly self-interested, nor
should they be. This theoretical structure is a system for the analysis
and prediction of behavior, like those used by natural scientists. It
can function as a theoretical system, indeed, only if it is in fact
simpler than the phenomena it describes. By definition, therefore, it
must be a reduction or simplification; this aspect of the theory is not
a defect but a virtue."
On this view the value of the theoretical structure lies not in its
stating truths about human nature, but in its permitting us to carry
out empirical investigations into the nature of the world, which will
in turn tend to prove or disprove the usefulness of this system as a
method of predicting human behavior. In other words economic
analysis should be regarded simply as an elaborate set of assumptions
that can be used to generate hypotheses which will ultimately be
tested by the study of specific transactions, either individual or
aggregative. On this view economics is ultimately the study of behavior. We think our system will provide a better basis for predicting
behavior than any alternative simplification, say the economists, but
we may be wrong, and in the spirit of science we will welcome
correction as well as confirmation. And we want to stress that even
if our theory is confirmed by the data, it will still not be an accurate
and complete representation of the world. It will remain a deliberately
reduced method of organizing data in order to make predictionswhat Milton Friedman calls a "filing system" 5-not a picture of
reality. By its nature this kind of theory is to be tested as a predictive
tool, not as a description.

5. See MILTON FREDMAN, The Methodology of Positive Economics, in
ESSAYS IN PosrrrE EcoNoMcs 3-43, at 7 (1953). For a lovely response, see the
Nutter Lecture delivered by Professor Coase, How Should Economists Choose?
(American Enterprise Inst. 1982).
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Economics is thus an attempt to apply the methodology of physics
to social phenomena, in the spirit of logical positivism, and it has
the familiar defects of such attempts, perhaps the most serious of
which is that its behaviorism is in principle incapable of explaining
the intellectual and discursive activity of economics itself, which
necessarily operates on wholly different assumptions. While physicists
must also worry about the tension between the determinism of their
discipline and their experience as people, at least they are not
themselves atoms in their deterministic systems. And while physics
no doubt constitutes a culture and a politics of its own, physics,
unlike economics, has no implicit political or moral view of the larger
social world to purvey.
B.

Real Commitments

That is one answer. But as you hear economists talk their view
of their language as merely hypothetical often seems to disappear. I
think it disappears in part because they really believe that it tells the
truth about the world (or about their own feelings); this is why they
talk this way and it is disingenuous to pretend that it is only a filing
system. They think it is the right filing system, descriptively as well
as predictively, or they wouldn't use it. 6 And it disappears for another
reason too, a psychological one: even if they begin as skeptics it is
impossible for them to remain so. As lawyers know-to their costit is very difficult to say things habitually, even things one doubts,
without coming to believe them. I think this necessarily happens to
economists as well, and to those noneconomists who start speaking
their language seriously.
Consider., for example, the use of what might be called technical
terms, such as "self-interest" or "rich." The economist assumes that
everyone is what he calls "self-interested." By this he does not
necessarily mean "selfish," but only that each actor makes up his
own mind about what his own values should be. These values may
be profoundly altruistic, leading the individual to make charitable
gifts to relieve the distresses of others or inspiring him to endow an
institution that exists for the public benefit. Similarly they may be
cultural, leading him to learn the cello, for example, or to become a
greatly ambitious, if monetarily impoverished, artist. It is solely for
the purpose of analyzing the activity of exchange that we assume
that each person is "self-interested." Self-interest on this view is not
the central human value (maybe not even a value at all), but simply
the umbrella term that includes all the values, whatever they may
happen to be, that individuals bring to their exchanges with others.

6.

On thiz point see Coase, supra note 5, at 6-7.
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Similarly, the word "rich" is used by economists to mean rich not
only in money, but rich in "utility" or "happiness" too. It makes
perfectly good sense that a person who is motivated by the desire to
become "rich" in this sense might seek to imitate the life of Mother
Theresa. The economist would say that such a person, however
impoverished in material terms, is in fact "richer" than he would
have been had he engaged in an alternative but more financially
remunerative form of life. Likewise the clause "everything is for
sale," or actually "sold," is said not to express a value, but to state
what might be called an analytic fact: that we can analyze all
transactions that actually occur between people, and those that do
not, as if "sales" were contemplated and either consummated on
not, even where the actor in question does not think of himself as
willing to sell his honesty, his health, or his body for any price, or
even where the two actors think of themselves not as self-interested
negotiators but as friends eager to help one another.
In this way "self-interest" and "rich" and "for sale" and other
similar terms can be claimed to be technical terms, which should
be understood in a technical way and not taken to mean what they
appear to mean. But can this work? I think one cannot habitually think of human action in such terms-especially in a culture
like our own, which is so heavily dominated by the motive of selfinterest in the usual sense, that of selfishness or self-centeredness
-without in fact universalizing the ordinary rather than the technical meaning. 7 The result is to validate both selfishness and the
desire to acquire and consume. In the terms offered by this language,
for example, one cannot criticize another for selfishness, or for
wanting to be rich in grossly materialistic ways, for we are all "selfinterested," we all want to be "rich." And the use of "self-interest"
to comprise all motives, including altruism, the use of "wealth" to
comprise all values, including ascetic ones, destroys distinctions that
are essential to our ethical thought: between selfishness and generosity, for example, or between avarice and moderation. It is a very
reduced idea of "altruism" to say that it is what apparently-but
only apparently-serves someone else's interest rather than one's own.
In such a language there can be neither the virtue nor the duty of
charity.
I think, then, that the language of economics cannot remain
merely an "abstract filing system," in part because it isn't one in
the first place and in part because no language can make such a
claim. It necessarily becomes a language to which those who think
in its terms are committed; it affects what they say, what they see,
how they think, what they feel, and what they are. If we use it, it

7. See generally IAN ROBINSON, Tm SURVIVAL, OF ENGLISH (1973); GEORGE
ORWELL, Politics and the English Language, in COLLECTED ESSAYS (1961).
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will affect us in these ways too. It is not, as some might claim,
politically or culturally "empty," but a powerful political and cultural
system in its own right. It is an ideology as well as a method. It is
offered to the law, by some at least, as the language in which legal
analysis should proceed-as the language in which lawyers and judges
should think and converse-and to the public more generally as the
language in which the polity should organize its life. For some of its
practitioners and admirers it holds out the promise of universality,
of being or becoming the one system in which all social phenomena
can rationally be talked about, analyzed, and judged.' Before accepting it we should think hard about what it promises. To repeat,
what kind of culture does it offer us?
IV.

ECONOMICS AS A SYSTEM OF VALUES

We can start with the question of value. In its purest form
economics claims to be a value-free social science. But as I suggested
earlier I think it in fact enacts a set of values, including political
ones, values to which the speaker of the language cannot avoid
finding himself at least in part committed.
A.

In the World

Think, for example, of the way in which economics defines the
economic actor and the processes by which he functions. He is for
the most part assumed to be an individual of indeterminate age, sex,
race and cultural background, but of adequate competence at manipulating economic relations. He acts as one who is both perfectly
aware of his own wishes and wholly rational-in the special sense in
which that term is used, to mean "calculating" -in his pursuit of
them. He exists as an individual, not as part of a community, except
insofar as he establishes contractual or exchange relations with others.
He is assumed to be motivated by self-interest, which in turn is
defined in terms of competition, acquisition, and dominion, at least
in relation to resources and other actors, for in the process of
exchange the self is reduced to those desires.

8. Is is hard to exaggerate the magnitude of the claims that have been made
for economics. In The Economic Approach to Human Behavior, for example, Gary
Becker says that in his view "the economic approach provides a united framework
for understanding behavior that has long been sought by and eluded Bentham,
Comte, Marx, and others." BECKER, supra note 1, at 12. Judge Easterbrook says
that "economics is applied rationality." Easterbrook, Method, Result, and Authority: A Reply, 98 HAgv. L. REv. 622, 625 (1985). Or take this remark by George J.
Stigler: "All of man's deliberative, forward-looking behavior follows the principles

of economics." Convocation Address, The University of Chicago Record at 2 (June
1, 1981)
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Of course a particular individual may have other values-indeed
the economist insists that he must, calling them "tastes" or "preferences"-perhaps including a "taste" for altruism, for peace and
quiet, for heavy metal music, for appreciating nature unspoiled, for
beautiful or ugly art, and so forth. These values will drive his
participation in the exchange process, or his decision to withdraw
from it. But in either case they are themselves valued by the method
of exchange: either by an actual exchange that takes place or by a
hypothetical or imagined exchange that is forgone (or in a more
complicated case by a combination of exchanges made and forgone).
In both cases these external values are converted by the discourse
into the acquisitive or instrumental values-the desire to extend the
dominion of the will-that all economic actors are assumed to have,
for this is the only kind of value about which economics can directly
talk.
With respect to the external values in their original form, the
system is purportedly "value neutral." That is, it regards individual
values as simply exogenous to the system itself. Economics of course
recognizes that these values exist, but it demeans them by calling
them "tastes" or "preferences," names that imply that no serious
conversation can proceed on such subjects. 9 And economics itself is
by definition not about those values, but about the process by which
they are reflected in the activity of exchange. This means that
economics cannot, in principle, talk about any value other than the
acquisitive or instrumental one that it universalizes. (Indeed it does
not talk about this value either, but merely assumes and acts upon
it.) This is not to be "value free," as its apologists claim, but to
make self-interest the central, indeed almost the only, value, for it is
the only one that can be talked about in these terms. To come at it
the other way, it is to claim that all values can be talked about, at
least for some purposes, as if they were selfish, quantifiable, and
interchangeable.
As I suggested earlier, an economist might here respond that the
values that lead the self to engage in acquisition may themselves be
altruistic or spiritual-for example, a desire to help the poor or to
make beautiful music-and that economics recognizes this fact. It
just regards choices of that sort as the domain of the actor, not of
the science of exchange. But this does not change my main point,
for it remains true that economics talks about such private values in
a language of self-interested individualism, and this is to erase them,
if only for the time being, as what they are. The conventions of this
discourse necessarily habituate its user to thinking in terms of self-

9.

For differing views on this question see generally SCITOVSKY, supra note

1, and Stigler & Becker, De Gustibus Non Est Disputandum, 67 AM. ECON. REV.
76 (1977).
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interest as a central principle, and in practice the "time being" is
likely to stretch on forever. The reference to "altruistic selfishness"
is a disclaimer in its way as unconvincing as Milton Friedman's claim
that economics is only a filing system.
Yet economics is troubling not only for the self-interested values
it directly asserts, but also for the very neutrality, the "value freedom," that it claims. It is in principle neutral on all questions of
value that are external to the acquisitive and competitive ones enacted
in the exchange game, which it lumps together as "tastes" or
"preferences" among which no distinctions can be drawn. But this
is to be silent on all the great questions of human life: questions of
beauty and ugliness in art and music, sincerity and falsity in human
relations, wisdom and folly in conduct and judgment, and the greatest
of all questions, which is how we ought to lead our lives. Economic
analysis assumes as a given the existence of "tastes" or "preferences"
which drive the system, but economics as a language can provide no
way of talking about these values, whether in oneself or another, no
way of thinking about which to prefer and which not.' 0 To the extent
that economics does reach out for these questions it may be worse
than silent, for silence after all can be a mode of controlling a
discourse. When economics tries to speak about these matters it does
so in the only way it knows how to speak, in purely quantitative
terms and on the assumption that all human transactions can be
reduced to the model of exchange.

For the purposes of economic analysis all human wishes and
desires are thus reduced to the same level, as though no principled
choices could be made among them, as though it didn't matter what
choices one made. This in turn means that it is impossible to talk in
these terms about our most important choices as individuals and
communities, or about the education of mind or heart, for any
impulse that we or others may happen to have is as good, valid, and
entitled to respect as any other.
Viewed as a recipe for life this is of course impossible, as
philosophers have repeatedly shown since Plato's original destruction
of Callicles' adoption of such a position in the Gorgias. Socrates
asked Callicles how high the pleasure of scratching an itch ranked

10. The only way an economist qua economist can judge the merit of a poem
or a painting or a work of philosophy, - or even of economics? - is by asking
how well it prevails in the market place. The test of excellence is what survives. This
may be true, in a trite way, but to say so does nothing to tell us how to judge the
excellence of a particular work, that is, whether or not we should contribute to its

survival.
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with him, or the pleasure of cowardice. Once these are demoted
below other pleasures one has committed oneself to a scale of value,
and the only question is what it shall be. To claim that this is a
wholly private question, not the proper subject of shared conversation, is either to say that the question is trivial or that we cannot
help each other address it, both of which are impossible positions.
We must and do have preferences, as the economist knows; and these
necessarily commit those who have them to the inquiry of better and
worse, as well as to that of greater and less. To refuse to engage in
this inquiry-to privatize it-as economics in its neutral phase necessarily does, is to deny an essential and necessary aspect of human
life. To reduce all value to self-interest, as it does the rest of the
time, is intellectually and ethically intolerable." How could one
educate one's children or oneself to live in a world that was neutral
on all the great questions of life, except that it reduced them to
acquisition, competition, and calculation?
B.

Among Economists

There is another dimension to economics, as a discourse among
economists. Here too, in the discourse, values are of necessity enacted. For example, economics necessarily values the reduction of
life to terms such as I describe, for this is what it achieves. It values
linear reasoning and competition for dominance. This last is especially
so among economists, for it is ostensibly a premise of economic
discourse, as a rule of proof appropriate to a science, that we will
believe only what we are forced by logic and fact to believe. This
means that economic conversations-like certain other academic discussions-are often attempts to compel others to submit to one's
views, or to resist such submission. In doing so they necessarily
perform a claim that this is the most appropriate and valuable way
to converse on these subjects, itself a most dubious position.

11.

In this connection consider Thucydides' History of the Peloponnesian

War, which traces the effects of the Athenian decision to ground all public thought

and conduct in self-interest. The result is the complete intellectual and moral collapse
not only of the larger community of states but of the Athenian polity itself, and the
consequent loss of Athens' capacity to function rationally at all. One lesson of this
text is that rational discourse about human choices must focus on the question of
justice as well as that of expediency. Another might be that "self-interest" requires
a different emphasis from the usual-'"self-interest"-in recognition of the fact that
coherence of character is essential to all success and that this coherence is always
social in its origins and maintenance. A true "self-interest" would then require one
to assert an interest in the culture and the community of which one was a part. For
an elaboration on this point, and for further discussion of Plato's treatment of
Callicles in the Gorgias, see J. WrE, WHEN WoRDs Lose TiEI MEANING 53-113
(1984).
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But the rule of proof just described applies only to conclusions
reached from the assumed premises, not to the premises themselves.
These are in fact chosen; and this choice expresses a wish or a value
that should, like other choices, be subjected to critical examination.
But in economics it is not and cannot be, for these are the premises
of the discourse and cannot be questioned in its terms.
The claim that microeconomics is a value-free science is thus false
in at least two ways. First, even as a science it is not value-free, for
no science can be. It values the positivist and behaviorist premises
from which it functions, the reduction of reason to calculation, the
performed conversion of the world into quantifiable units, and so
on. Second, economics attributes motives and values to its actors,
those of acquisitiveness and self-interest, and invests itself in these
attributions, which it assumes to be universal. This assumption is
qualified by the recognition that one actor may choose to act for
others, but in the end economics always reduces motive to selfinterest, the only kind of motive it can conceive of and speak about.
The reduction of all human interaction to the model of exchange,
actual or imagined, simply erases whole fields of life and thought,
from art to morals, for economics recognizes no ground, other than
competitive survivability, upon which one can choose one form of
life or one work of art over another, or even upon which one can
choose to favor the market and its methods of analysis over others.
In saying that "value-free" economics is actually committed to
certain values, both in the assumptions it makes about the world and
in the conventions by which its own discourse operates, I do not
mean to suggest that the field is in this respect peculiar. Quite the
contrary. As I say above I think that all systems of discourse commit
their users to values and do so in both domains, that is in one's
account of the "other world" one talks about and in the here-andnow world one creates by talking. Science does this, and so do law
and literary criticism too. Economics is not to be blamed, then, for
having values. But no one should be allowed to claim value-neutrality
where it does not exist, and economics, like other disciplines, -can be
praised or blamed for the values it has. All of us, economists and
lawyers and lecturers among the rest, should be held responsible for
the values we enact in our talking.
All this is not to say that economics is wrong to do what it does,
namely, to isolate the practices of exchange for study, especially
when its results are applied to spheres of life that are in fact
characterized by exchanges that take place on conditions roughly
matching the assumptions of the discourse. This is, after all, a good
deal of the economic life of the investor or entrepreneur in a capitalist
economy. But it is to say that this study would lead to insanity unless
it were premised on a recognition that these activities, and the culture
they and their study together create, require subordination to other
activities and cultures, both at the level of the individual and of the
polity.
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V.

ECONOMICS AS A POLITICAL SYSTEM

An economist might agree with most of this and say that the
language and practices in which he engages as an economist must
somehow be put together with the languages and practices that make
up the rest of his life, both public and private. This would raise the
wonderfully interesting and important question, how this might be
done, and with what effect on economics itself, a question to which
I shall return below.
But another line of justification is possible as well, one that
neither denies the political character of this discourse nor seeks to
subordinate it to other languages and practices, but affirmatively
celebrates the politics and ethics that this kind of economics entails,
mainly on the ground that the market is affirmatively desirable both
as a model of life and as a political and social institution. The
premises of the analytic method, in other words, can be regarded as
the proper premises upon which to build our collective life.' 2 In
talking this way the economist moves off the ground of purportedly
pure science. He begins to use his language not as a "filing system"
but as a way of expressing overt social and political attitudes, largely
in support of the institution of the market. I should stress that not
all economists would take this step. But some would. They are of
course perfectly entitled to do so, but only to the extent that their
politics and ethics, not their economics, persuade us of the rightness
of their vision.
A.

Justifying the Market as a Model of Life

The institution of the market is celebrated by its proponents
because in their view it is democratic-each person brings to the
market his own values and can "maximize" them his own way-and
because it is creative and open, leaving the widest room for individual
choice and action. The market establishes a community based upon
a competitive process that allows each person freedom to choose
what to do with what is his. These merits mean, for some economists
at least, that all social institutions ought to be modified to approximate the market-to conform to the analytic model of life as
exchange-or at least to be analyzed and judged on that presumption.
The market is further justified, when such justification is thought
necessary, in either of two rather conflicting ways. The first is to say

12. It is usual for economists to draw a bright line between "positive" and
"normative" economics, and of course there are differences in emphasis between
studies that set out to examine "what is" and those that ask "what ought to be."
But part of my point is that this is a difference of emphasis only, not a radical shift
of category: "positive" economics enacts "norms," or what I have called values,
and "normative" economics depends completely upon its claims that the world "is"
a certain way.
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that the market is good because it promotes efficiency, that is to say
it maximizes the "welfare" of all participants in the process. It does
this by definition, because each person participates in the process
only because he thinks he gets more that way than he would any
other way, and who are we to tell him differently? In maximizing
the welfare of all participants it does the same for society as a whole,
which is nothing more or less than the sum of all the participants in
the market. The obvious trouble with this is that it takes for granted
not only the existing values (or "tastes") of the actors, but also the
existing distributions among them of wealth, capacity, and entitlement, which it has no way of criticizing. Yet these may of course be
eminently criticizable.
The "welfare" defense of the market would justify all transactions-including the sale of oneself into slavery or prostitution-that
are not in an obvious sense "coerced" by another because they are
marginal improvements for the actors involved. But an economy
might provide a different set of starting points for its actors, so that
such degrading activities would no longer be "improvements" for
anyone. We would all benefit from living in such a world. But the
economist has no way of saying this. On the premises I have described
he cannot deny the desirability of redistribution, but he cannot affirm
it either. Even to discuss the question requires a shift of discourse,
to ways of talking that economics of the sort I have been discussing
excludes.
The second ground upon which the market is justified is that not
of its gross effects but of its fairness. In one version this justification
rests upon the ethical standing of voluntary action and holds that
the results of the market process are justified with respect to every
actor because the choices by which the market works are voluntary.
In another version, it becomes the affirmative celebration of autonomy or liberty: whether or not it is efficient, the market is good
because it gives the widest possible range to freedom of choice and
action. Here the claim moves beyond justifying market results by the
voluntary character of the choices upon which they rest to the point
of asserting autonomy as the central social and political value. The
obvious trouble with this line of defense, in both of its forms, is that
it assumes that all exchanges are for all actors equally voluntary and
equally expressive of autonomy, a position that common sense denies.
B.

Voluntariness and Autonomy

Let us begin with the "voluntariness" of the exchanges studied,
which is essential both to the "welfare" and to the "autonomy"
justifications. It is one thing to construct an analytic model that
assumes voluntary choice as a way of working out what the consequences of such an exchange system would be if it existed, and for
those purposes to write off constraints on conduct as one writes off
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abnormal incompetence and so forth. It is quite another to say that
all human behavior not obviously coerced should be regarded as
having the ethical or moral status of wholly free, autonomous action,
which is entitled to our respect if anything is. Obviously most human
choice is greatly constrained, some of it cripplingly so. It may be
true that I sell my labor for the minimum wage, working at a noisy,
ugly, demeaning, boring, and perhaps dangerous job, but only because that is the best I can do. I do not want that choice to be given
the sort of standing that an investor's choice to go for stocks rather
than bonds, or my own choice to spend Saturday afternoon on the
river or at the museum, should be given.' 3
Not only are we are differently situated economically, and in
ways that deeply affect the voluntariness of our choices, we are
unequally situated psychologically as well. Some of us are much freer
from conflicts, compulsions, and similar afflictions than others are.
The choices of such people are entitled to a different kind of respect
from, say, the decision of an addict to continue a drug, or of a
prostitute to continue living, the life of abuse to which self-hatred
commits him. Close inspection of criminal conduct makes it very
hard to rest the validity of punishment comfortably on the basis of
the free 'and autonomous moral choices made by those we punish.
The "voluntary choice" model may be useful for analyzing certain
kinds of conduct-especially that of the self-conscious and competent
professional risk-taker who operates in a universe of quantitative
symbols, such as the capitalist investor whose modes of thought so
deeply shape the discourse of economics-but it .does not adequately
describe most human behavior. In making ethical judgments, including judgments about social institutions, it is of central importance to
keep vivid our sense of the different degrees and kinds of freedom
that different actors have-and these are exactly those differences to
which the "voluntary choice" model is systematically blind.
At a different level, to reduce the ideas of voluntary action,
autonomy, and liberty to mere freedom from restraint, or, even more
narrowly, to freedom from governmental restraint, as these justifications do, is deeply impoverishing. For us political liberty has not
meant merely freedom from restraint but enablement or capacitation,
and this is always social and communal in character. The question is
not only how far people are free or restrained in their exercise of
dominion over the assets that nature and society give them, but far
more importantly, what our community enables its people to do or

13.

My point here goes beyond the issue of constraint to the assumption of

economics that all choices are comparable. In fact, choosing what to do with one's
money is radically different from choosing what to do with one's body, one's time,
or one's mind. To deny this assumes a commensurability of human decisions that
experience denies.
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to become. What range of responsibilities and participations, what
opportunities for self-development and education, what roles in selfgovernment, does this community offer its members? These are the
serious questions about liberty-defining the kind of liberty one could
imagine fighting and perhaps dying for, liberty as an aspect of
community. To speak to such questions one needs a standard of
human and political excellence of a kind that economics by its nature
cannot have.
C. Self-Transformation and Education
The incapacity of economics to reflect degrees of voluntariness is
actually a particular instance of a larger feature of the discourse, one
that derives from its quasi-mathematical character. Its use of labels
is inherently binary. One either is or is not "competent," an action
is or is not "voluntary," because the formulas that are the stuff of
economic thought require that a particular person, object, or event
either be, or not be, an "A" or a "B" or whatever other label is
used.' 4 This is a ruling principle of the sort of logic upon which
economics depends. Of course, our actual experience is not of binary
or dichotomous phenomena but of degree and of change; our ordinary language, in its imprecisions and overlappings, reflects that fact.
But none of this can be reflected in the language of economics.
The consequences are serious, and reach beyond the issue of
voluntariness to the whole conception of the human being that this
discourse makes possible. I put aside for the moment the question
of motive (reduced to self-interest) and intellectual process (reduced
to calculation) and focus on something even more basic, the fact that
in our actual lives all human beings are engaged in a never-completed
process of growth and change, from infancy to old age. We start,
and often end, in total dependence on others; our capacities gradually
develop and shift, and some of them necessarily deteriorate; illness,
in one form or another is nearly universal; and death lies always at
the end. Our lives are a process of organic growth and decay. The
development of wisdom, judgment, taste, and character; of the
capacity for meaningful action and meaningful speech; of an intelligible identity in relation to others - this is the stuff of human life.
It makes no sense of this experience to speak as if each point on
the curve of life is exactly the same as every other point, except for
those before and after some arbitrarily chosen lines of "competence."
Full competence is never attained; weakness and misunderstanding
and internal conflict are parts of every human life. To speak of what

14. It is of course true that in talking about the relations among the entities
it thus creates, economics speaks not in "either/or" terms but in continuous
functions, but this does not change my point in the text.
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we do as if all, or almost all, human conduct is equally competent,
voluntary, and rational and entitled to respect as such, is to establish
a vision that denies the central process of life, the transformation of
the self through interactive experience with others. The human individual is not an integer, a feature of a mathematical system, as
economics assumes, but-fortunately for us-is instead the locus of
conflict, tension, and growth, a place where many selves live together,
sometimes in harmony, sometimes not. On the economic view, however, the individual is reduced to a single unit, supposed to know its
own values and how best to pursue them. This means that education-for the rest of us the process by which character and value are
formed-is reduced to the acquisition of information. True education
of the mind and self is in such terms completely unimaginable; so
too is the conception of the polity as a means of collective education.
D.

Dollar Democracy

I wish now to consider more fully the point made above that the
language of economics is blind to the differences of wealth among
different actors in the real world and hence to what many of us
would regard as the inherent unfairness of the transactions in which
they engage. One response to this point is to say that the distribution
of wealth is not an economic but a political question, and that society
ought simply to decide what it wants to do about unequal distribution
and then do it. The economist as such has no special wisdom on that
matter, and thus no objection in principle to any political decisions
made, including those involving radical redistribution. If sincerely
meant this position is, so far, unobjectionable. But how can one
happily continue to study and play the game, and impliedly assert its
fairness, without ever asking what its premises are? If one cannot
ask such a question "as an economist" one can ask it as an
independent mind, and should not one's answer show up in one's
life and work, one way or another? 5
Another response of the economist is simply to make the assumption formal, give it a name-the marginal utility of moneyand then claim that a dollar is worth the same to a rich man as a
poor man, or at least that we cannot claim that it is worth less. This
is said to be required by the primary assumption of the discourse
that utility, or value, is individually determined, a matter on which

15. If not, what is one saying about economics: that it can exist as a wholly
distinct discourse, in the mind or in the culture, without interaction with other
discourses? But what one knows as a person can and should show up in what one
says as an economist. By what process, upon what understandings, and subject to
what what kinds of control can this happen? This is a centrally important question,
to which I briefly return at the end of this paper.
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therefore the economist, as an economist, cannot speak. If so, the
transactions between rich and poor are not unfair in the sense
claimed. This justification appears to rest on other-respecting agnosticism-Who am I to speak about the experience of others?-but I

think it is so unrealistic that it must be rooted in desire, either in the
desire not to think about such things or in the desire to see, and
participate in, real differences in wealth and power. (Who am I to
say that this chocolate eclair is not worth more to the fat rich man
than this loaf of bread is to the poor woman with three hungry
children? 16)

The position on the marginal utility of money itself is easily
refutable, and not only by appealing to one's capacity to imagine
with sympathy the plight of others. Think, for example, of one
voluntary institution that does in fact work by exchange and riskassessment: the poker game. The poker game depends entirely upon
the rough economic equality of the participants. Otherwise the process
of bluffing and betting becomes both unfair and uninteresting and
the poorer player quits. The rich man has the edge every time, for
what he risks is worth less to him than the same amount to his
poorer neighbor, and everyone knows it.17 The same is true of the
market itself. To the claim that the market is a fair game and its
results entitled to ethical respect, one can respond that this game
would be fair, if at all, only if the conditions on which we played it
were roughly similar for all of us, which they patently are not.
The market purports to rest upon an assumption of the equality
of all the actors in the system. In fact, it rests upon a different
assumption, namely, the equality of every dollar in the system. Since
some players have many more dollars, and through this fact are at a
competitive advantage, it is a system that actively supports inequality
among its actors."8

16. See Cooter & Rappoport, Were the Ordinalists Wrong About Welfare
Economics?, 22 J. ECON. Lrr. 507 (1984) (discussing the difference between this
kind of "agnostic" economics and an earlier one that saw certain needs, such as
food, shelter, and health, as primary).
17. The poor man, out of desperation, will often engage in other sorts of
gambling, from numbers to slot machines. But poker, like the market, is a game
not of luck but of skill on certain conditions, and the player with limited funds
faces a worse fate than simply having numerical odds against him. How would you
respond to an invitation to spend a pleasant evening playing Monopoly, on the
understanding that one of the players started with three-quarters of the total wealth?
The shifting value of money can be suggested by a question of another kind:
how would you like to be given one million dollars? Ten million? A billion or a
hundred billion? At some point it would run, and ruin, your life. For all of us who
are not insane - I think of Ferdinand Marcos here - the value of money ultimately
becomes negative.
18. At this point, as I suggested above, some apologists for economics would
concede the point and say that it is not our object to make people equal but to
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It is not too much to say, I think, that the modem celebration
of the market as the central social institution-the most fair, the
most respecting of autonomy, and the most efficient-threatens to
destroy the single greatest achievement of Western political culture:
the discovery that a community can govern itself through a rule of
law that attempts to create a fundamental moral and political equality
among human beings. The great phrase in the Declaration of Independence-"all men are created equal"-is partly a theological statement about the conditions under which we are created and partly a
political statement about the obligation of the government to acknowledge, indeed to create or recreate, that equality. This value is
the heart of what is meant both by equality under law and by our
democratic institutions more generally, resting as they do on the
premise that each person's vote is worth exactly what everyone else's
is. The ideology of the market, if it prevailed in its desire to convert
all institutions into markets, would destroy this set of political
relations and would create another in its stead, based upon the dollar.
From the point of view of the market and its proponents the
government is not what our legal and constitutional tradition insists
it is, an institution of self-government, but an alien force, not
expressing the judgment of the people, not constituting them as a
polity, but interfering in their affairs. To talk about "governmental
intervention," for example, is implicitly to assume that there is a
pre-governmental state of nature called the market, into which the
government intrudes. But this is obviously silly. The entire process
depends upon the protection of government, as the proponents of
the market should know, for without it they could not hold on to
what the social system gives them. Boiled down to essentials, then,
the argument really is not that the government should not "intervene," but that it should do so solely on behalf of the market, to
reinforce its methods and results, including its inequalities.
A related mythology is that the results of the market system are
to be regarded as immutable because any "interference" with them
would violate the rights of the possessors to the enjoyment and use
of what they had acquired, including its further use in the market to

maximize efficiency, "not to distribute wealth but to create it." If inequality
promotes that, we are as a group by hypothesis better off. This move demonstrates
one of the peculiarities of economic reasoning alluded to above: its necessary
emptiness on philosophical and moral questions. Two economists may agree on the
beauty of the market system, one grounding his belief in an unarticulated, or barely
articulated, statement about the value of autonomy or liberty, the other on a
similarly conclusory statement about the value of efficiency. But it is a consequence
of the value-neutrality described above that the economists as economists have no
way of talking about these important differences. These remain external to economic
discourse, just as other values do. Economic discourse, though radically value-laden,
is incapable of transforming itself into a discourse about value.
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increase their wealth and power. These rights are often spoken of as
"natural rights," as though each of us had wrung his wealth from
the soil by the sweat of his brow. But the truth is that wealth is
always social, produced not only by one's own labors but by the
contributions of many others, upon whom both its acquisition and
retention alike depend. It is- not I alone who have earned what I
make, for I could not make it without the constant cooperation of
others, who are often paid far less than I.

The market ideology claims to be radically democratic and egalitarian because it leaves every person free to do with her own what
she will. But this freedom of choice is not equally distributed among
all people. The market is democratic not on the principle of one
person one vote, but on the far different principle of one dollar, one
vote. One could hardly make a greater mistake than to equate, as so
much modern public talk carelessly does, the "free market" with
democracy.
There are two distinct points here. First, the exchange transactions
that the market celebrates are not entitled to the special respect
claimed for them as free and voluntary, and hence fair, unless each
person has roughly the same amount of money and the same competence and freedom in its use, which is demonstrably not the case.
The accumulations of wealth it permits thus cannot be justified by
the fairness of the transactions by which the accumulation occurs.
Second, if the advocates of the market succeeded in converting other
institutions into markets, the result would be to transfer to those
who have wealth not only the economic power that inescapably
follows it but also the political power that in our democratic tradition
the people have claimed for themselves and have exercised through
the institutions of self-government. This would validate and institutionalize private economic power held by one person over another,
of the rich over the poor. 19 If we were to yield entirely to its claims,
we would gradually find our traditional government, which operates
by collective deliberation on a premise of fundamental equality of

19. The neutrality of economic discourse as to gender, race, class, and so on,
is structurally similar to its neutrality on questions of value, discussed above. The
surface neutrality, which seems to make it an egalitarian system, is in practice simply
a mask for the validation of whatever inequalities actually exist in the world, which
it leaves untouched.
I would of course not want to deny that our democratic polity can itself
exploit, oppress, and disempower, for of course it can and does. But it does so
against its own ideals, against the pressure of its institutions and languages, not it
accordance with them.
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citizens, replaced by a private-sector government of the few over the
many, wholly unregulated by collective judgment.
VI.

ECONOMICS AS A SYSTEM OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS

But it is not only as a system of value and politics that this kind
of economics, and the ways of thought it encourages, are troubling.
I think that it is distorted and unrealistic as a way of imagining,
thinking about, and shaping the processes of production and exchange
that we think of as the economy itself.
A.

The Social and Natural Matrix

The first distortion I wish to consider has to do with the relationship between the exchange system and the cultural and natural
world that it necessarily presupposes. What I mean is this. The
economic activity of exchange takes place under natural and cultural
conditions that are absolutely essential to it, but about which economics has no way of talking except by itemization, quantification,
and conversion into the material of actual or hypothetical exchange.
All talk about exchanges, that is, necessarily presupposes that the
exchangers live in the natural world of sun, air, and water, subject
to the powers of growth and health and disease, a world the organization of which is complex far beyond our understanding. Each of
the exchangers is part of that world in another sense as well, for
each is himself an organism, and one that incompletely understands
both himself and his relation to the natural world upon which he
absolutely depends for his existence. The language of economics
similarly assumes the existence of a society and culture, a set of
human understandings and expectations upon which each exchanger
can rely: that promises will normally be kept, that one can get one's
money home without being robbed, that it is worth thinking about
the future, for oneself or for one's children, and so on. What is
more, the actor's motives or values (what the economists call his
"preferences") are themselves formed by interactions both with his
culture and with nature. This is how we are made as individuals,
how we cohere as a community, and how we connect ourselves to
the past and to the future.
But on all this economics is silent, for it begins to speak only
when an actor has, at least in his mind, identified some item in the
world and begun to think of exchanging it for something else. It is
his judgment of its worth, in exchanging it or in declining to do so,
that is for the economist its value. But what confidence can we have
in such judgments of worth, by actors necessarily imperfectly aware
both of themselves and of the cultural and natural worlds they
inhabit? To put it in epistemological terms, the economist assumes
that there is nothing to be known about the natural or cultural world
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that cannot be known through the process of exchange itself. But in
order to judge the value of an item now, or to predict one for the
future (which is very much the same thing), one must make estimates
about possible changes in the social, cultural, and natural matrix in
which all exchange takes place, and about the effect of this and
similar exchanges upon that matrix. There is no reason to be especially confident in anyone's capacity to make such estimates.
Another way to put this point is to say that economics sees all
value in terms of margins, comparisons, and differences and has no
way of talking directly about the matters or items that it compares.
Thus it sees the difference between what beans cost at the store and
what they cost to grow, but it has no way to value either base upon
which that difference rests, either the socio-cultural base that enables
the grocer to function securely or the natural base that produces the
beans. Predictions of future value depend upon a continued stability
in the base, which is not and cannot be measured by the value-asmargin method.
This is to talk about it in terms of knowledge, the knowledge
that the economist assumes we have. But it can be cast in terms of
value as well, for the language of economics assumes that the relation
between humanity and nature should be one of dominion, that the
expanded assertion of control by individual actors over naturecalled "natural resources"-is inherently a good thing. But why
should one grant such an assumption? As Wendell Berry repeatedly
points out in his works on agricultural economics, 20 modern agriculture can be considered a great technological success only if one uses
the measure of present-day output per man-hour, disregarding both
the destructive effects of modem farming on soil and water and the
costs, natural and economic, of the fossil fuels used for both fertilizer
and power. If productivity over decades or per acre is the test, as in
a world of five billion perhaps it should be, our agriculture falls well
below that of many more "primitive" peoples. If one includes the
meaning of the work the farmer does, its rhythms and its harmonies
or disharmonies with nature, the picture is complicated further; still
further if one asks how important it is in a nuclear age for a
particular polity, or for humanity, that the capacity for fruitful and
stable survival on a small scale be maintained. Economic language
assumes, with what a theologian like James Gustafson might call a
foolish pride 2 that man's wants and wishes are the ultimate measure
of value; it then claims that these wishes are constrained only in ways

20.
BERRY,

See generally WENDELL
THE

UNSETTLING

BERRY, THE GIFT OF GOOD LAND (1981); WENDELL
OF AMERICA (1977). See also Farm Achieves Natural

Balance, Washington Post, March 1, 1987, at A3, col. 1.
21. See JAMES GUSTAFSON, ETHICS FROM A THEOCENTRIC

PERSPECTIVE

(1981).
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that traders can see and account for. These are assumptions of fact
and value that one might generously regard as dubious.
The only kind of meaning economics can reflect is one that can
be expressed in the medium of exchange, that is, quantifiable and
comparative. This is in turn to give the world itself a meaning of a
new kind, reflected in the Japanese phrase for the blue sky that can
rarely be seen over Tokyo these days: it is called a "recession sky." ' 2
B.

Permanentand Renewable Resources

Another way to come at this question is to assume for the moment
the validity of the language of "resources" and "valuation," and
ask how adequately the market values resources that have a long or
indefinite life. I think that it systematically undervalues them and
that the reason has to do with the nature of an exchange-for-money
economy. Because for this kind of economics all value is ultimately
exchange value and hence, in our world, money value; and because
money has its own value, determined by supply and demand for
present capital; and because money value is always a rent, that is

22. Think in this connection of Thoreau's Walden, which expresses something
of what a life of marginal agriculture meant to the person doing it, and consider
how little of what that book and life are about could be expressed in economic
terms. This is true not only of his "noneconomic" activities, but of the agricultural
work itself, about which Thoreau is very explicit (especially in the first two chapters).
In "The Bean Field," he says:
When my toe tinkled against the stones, that music echoed to the woods
and to the sky, and was an accompaniment to my labor that yielded an
instant and immeasurable crop. It was no longer beans that I hoed or that
I hoed beans; and I remembered with as much pity as pride, if I remembered
them at all, my acquaintances who had gone to the city to attend the
oratorios.
HENRY DAVID THOREAU, WALDEN 143 (Mod. Libr. ed. 1950). Or think of what
Joseph Conrad, in his nautical novels and in his two volumes of autobiography, has
managed to make of an activity-sailing a ship-which in economic terms is simply
the transport of goods for a price. In The Mirror of the Sea, for example, he talks
about the difference between sail and steam in these terms:
History repeats itself, but the special call of an art which has passed away
is never reproduced. It is as utterly gone out of the world as the song of a
destroyed wild bird. Nothing will awaken the same response of pleasureable
emotion or conscientious endeavor. And the sailing of any vessel afloat is
an art whose fine form seems already receding from us on its way to the
overshadowed Valley of Oblivion. The taking of a modern steamship around
the world (though one would not minimize its responsibilities) has not the
same quality of intimacy with nature, which, after all, is the indispensable
condition for the building up of an art. It is less personal and a more exact
calling; less arduous, but also less gratifying in the lack of close communion
with the artist and the medium of his art. It is, in short, less a matter of
love.
JOSEPH CONRAD, THE MIRROR OF THE SEA 30 (Dent Collected ed. 1946).
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measured against time; and because the exchange method generates
the conception of income over time as the definition of wealth; this
kind of economics can have no way to measure any "resource" that
has a permanent value. In an environment in which individuals can
invest their capital in financial markets and obtain a return of so
much per year, all other investments that do not produce that income
per year are automatically unreasonable (unless they will produce
some exploding balloon of income in the not too far distant future).
The investment of money for a return thus becomes the model to
which all other investments are assimilated. On this method the
present value of anything that will come into possession very far in
the future, say fifty years hence, is nearly zero, even though in ways
not reflected in the income-over-time method of measuring wealth its
value in fact may be incalculable. This is true most obviously of
natural resources of the renewable kind (fisheries, forests, the soil
itself, and so on), but certainly no less so of the social and cultural
23
resources of which I spoke above.

What is more, the value of money (or other medium of exchange)
is itself completely dependent upon the larger social, natural, and
cultural context of which economic exchange is only a part. This
means that there is a kind of structural paradox: the possibility of
money rent in a capitalist system forces all other investments to that
model; but that model is itself parasitic upon other sources of value
that are not accurately reflected in it.
The "noneconomic background" that economics assumes to be
stable, and which it does not regard as a form of wealth (for it
cannot be appropriated and exchanged), is actually not stable at all
but in perpetual flux. It is our most important form of wealth. It
begins with soil and water and air, all of which we are now damaging
in ways we cannot possibly understand. It includes the mysteries of
vegetable and animal life, from microbes to mammals, and the value
of differentiation into species, which on principle cannot be known
until the crisis arrives-the change of weather or the spread of a
virus-that will destroy one adaptation and make room for another.
It extends to all the social instincts and habits that make collective
life possible, including our respect for law, our sense of civic obligation, and our desire to cooperate with others. In our own culture
it includes the habits of self-government-of respect for the majority
and minority alike-that run so deep within us, showing up as they

23.

One response to this line of argument is to say that if the future is

misvalued, it is only through the use of an inappropriate discount rate. But the
difficulty cannot be solved by simply changing the discount rate, for, owing to the
uncertainty as to the cultural and social base upon which wealth ultimately depends,

it is impossible to have any rate in which one can have confidence over an extended
period of time.

19861

ECONOMICS AND LA W

do in our competence at organizing ourselves into self-governing

communities.
"Exchange," upon which economics focuses so much, is a secondary rather than primary mode of life. It presupposes another
world, in which it is embedded and which it can strengthen or
weaken. Yet economics focuses only on exchange and has no way of
talking about this larger world, which operates on such wholly
different principles, let alone about the arts of social and communal
life by which it is maintained and remade. 24 One of the most
important of these is the law.
C.

False Segmentation

Even within the zone to which it speaks, economic language, like
the activity of exchange itself, requires the segmentation of the
universe in a way that is false to human experience and sometimes
destructive of it. Take for example the man or woman maintaining
a family garden: for the economist, though perhaps not for his
journalistic or political cousin, such a person is engaged in productive
work. But how is that work talked about? Our reasons for growing
beans rather than buying them (such as the pleasure of helping things
grow) are given value by being quantified, through the process of
hypothetical or constructive exchange.
But this requires a segmentation of experience that leads to a
false understanding and valuation both of what is segmented and
what cannot be, and denies the meaning of our activities as parts of
a larger life. I once heard an economist say that people obviously

24. It is of course true that one achievement of modern economics has been
to think seriously about the ways in which an activity or enterprise exacts costs from
others that are not reflected in the market price of the goods or services produced.
The market ideology I have been discussing, at least in its welfare rather than its
libertarian mode, naturally regards this, like any market imperfection, as a bad
thing: people should pay for what they get, or the whole calculus of competing
utilities is upset and we lose our confidence that market exchanges increase the total
welfare. In this sense economics does make an attempt to think about what I call
the social and natural matrix, and much of what has been done along these lines
has been helpful, particularly I suppose in environmental law. But when it does so,
it thinks not in terms of the community or the natural world that may be injured
or improved, but in terms of individuals suffering gains or losses. Its basic view of
the relation between humankind and nature, its reduction of community to individuals, and its methods of valuation remain the same, and these tend to be skewed in
the way I suggest in the text.
One way to frame this point is in terms of responsibility: the tendency of
economic discourse is to deny responsibility for maintaining the natural and cultural
base of wealth, just as it is to deny responsibility for the poor and incompetent.
But, putting aside the question of morality, the assumption that one can safely do
these things is hardly plausible. Compare Krier & Gillette, The Uneasy Case for
Technological Optimism, 84 MICH. L. Rav. 405 (1985).
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did not mind polluted air as much as was thought, citing the foul
air of Hammond, Indiana, where people were willing to live, as his
proof. But for many of them Hammond was home, and their living
there may be taken to show not how little they cared about the air
they breathed but how much they cared about their neighborhood,
their families and friends, features of life that could not 1e duplicated, by market or other means, in some other place, and which
could not adequately be reflected in the market economy. Or take
the false segmentation implicit in reducing what doctors and lawyers
do to medical or legal "services," which can be "delivered," as
though all of life could be reduced to a set of functions that are in
principle replaceable just like the parts of Mr. Colt's rifle-as
though there were no question of individual judgment, or knowledge, or history in the professional relationship. Can we similarly
reduce teaching, or being a parent, to a set of functions and services?
The segmentation of the exchange model tends to misvalue the
work we do for ourselves, which is most of the traditional work of
women, and much of men's work as well. If we hire each other to
do our work we see economic activity and growth, because presumably there is a beneficial difference in the exchange. If we do our
own work there is in terms of this kind of economics (though not
of our tax laws) still productivity, but since this productivity can be
measured only by the exchanges forgone, the valuation is false to
the meaning and nature of our activities looked at as parts of whole
lives. This is especially true of people who raise their own children.
Such work cannot be segmented into functions and then made the
material of the market process, actual or hypothetical, for what the
child requires is the sustained presence of, and interaction with, a
loving and respectful person, something no alternative can supply.
Similarly, housework has a different meaning when one is maintaining one's own home rather than acting as a servant for others. And
volunteer work, upon which much of the health of our community
depends, will be valued either not at all, as a kind of consumption,
or by the opportunities forgone, but in any event not for what it
is.

At the level of the national economy, this kind of economics
naturally tends to value what it calls economic "growth," that is
to say the expansion of the exchange system by the conversion of
what is outside it into its terms. It is a kind of steam shovel chewing
away at the natural and social world. Another kind of economics
might value not growth but conservation, not change or progress
but stability, not reduction of nature to commodity but the maintenance of a harmonious relation between humanity and nature,
between the domain of exchange and the other domains of human
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life. 25 It is a truism for economists that "we"

are much "richer"

than we were thirty years ago. But is that so obviously true if one
takes into account the value of safe streets, healthy food, clean air
and water, unspoiled scenery, a supportive community, or a sensible
pace of life? What is really meant by the economist who says such
things is that we have managed to turn more things into commodi-

ties.
The enormous matrix of productive human life and meaningful
activity that lies outside the practices of exchange, like the matrix of
the natural world, is simply excluded from the exchange mentality;
or, it if is included, it is on terms that destroy its meaning. Economics
of the kind I have been discussing is thus defective even as an
economics, for it in principle abstracts from a larger context a set of
activities that depend upon, and interact with, that context. A proper
economics-in its Greek root meaning household managementwould respect and reflect the conditions, natural and cultural, upon
which the exchange system itself depends, and would seek to value
properly what that system by its nature radically undervalues.
D.

Erasing Community

For similar reasons this kind of economics has the greatest
difficulty in reflecting the reality of human community and the value
of communal institutions. Its necessary tendency seems to be to
destroy the idea of public action, indeed the idea of community
itself. This is partly because this methodology tends to resolve all
communities and organizations into the individual human actors who
constitute them, partly because commitment to the market system
leads one to think that everything that can be made the subject of
the market should be. The idea is that every economic actor should
pay for what he wants, and should not have to pay for what he
doesn't want. But this tends to destroy our public institutions, all of
which extend benefits far beyond those who would pay (if they were
reduced to markets) or who do pay (when they are supported by
taxes). Such institutions reflect a communal judgment that we need
to educate ourselves and each other, that our "tastes" are not all of
equal value but need to be formed, and formed well rather than
badly. Public universities, libraries, orchestras, museums, parks 26-

25. In this sense the modem economics of which I speak is radical-revolutionary really-rather than conservative. Compare the economics of Edmund Burke,
for example, which included in its purvey the need for the improvement and
conservation of both the culture and the land as well as their productive uses. See
generally EDMUND BURKE, REFLECTIONS ON THE REvOLUTION IN FRANCE (1790),
discussed in J. WMTE, WHEN WORDS LosE THEm MEANING 192-230 (1984).
26. I include in the term "public" not only those facilities owned or managed
by public agencies, but those (almost all the rest) that are subsidized by our tax
system.
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all these would fall before the ideology that denies the existence and
reality of community and reduces all27 institutions, all human production, to the language of the market.
Think here of the way economists explain why people who will
probably never visit, say, the Everglades or an art museum are happy
to have their taxes used to maintain them. The economist says it is
because the actor wants to maintain the option of visiting them some
day, and calls this an "option demand." But may it not be that the
voter simply takes pleasure in what other people have and in what
other people can do, in belonging to a community that is good for
all its members? Or that he respects their desires and wants a
community based on that kind of mutual respect? This possibility is
systematically denied by the assumption of economic talk, that individuals and communities are in principle incapable of generosity, or
more precisely, that "altruism" can adequately be talked about as a
species of selfishness.
The language of self and self-interest not only fails to reflect the
reality of community and of shared interests, it draws attention away
from those aspects of life and devalues them. To continue to talk on
these assumptions, even hypothetically, is to encourage "self-interest"
in an ethical sense and to erode the commitments we have to each
other that underlie such essential practices of citizenship as the
willingness to pay taxes, to work for the local school, or to serve in
the army, upon which everything depends. To adopt the economic
view would in fact threaten the very existence of community, for on
these premises no one would conceivably die or seriously risk his life
for his community: at the point of danger one's self-interest in
survival would outweigh all other self-interests. And to speak of all
"tastes" as if they were equivalent is to invite oneself and others to
think that they are, and to confirm the premises of our culture,
already drummed into the mind by the consumer economy, that the
consumer is king, that whatever you happen to want is a good that

27. This at least is the tendency of the popularized version of this kind of
economics. In its more sophisticated forms it seeks to describe and explain cooperation-this is what the literature on the institution of the firm is about, for examplebut it does so in its familiar terms, those of individual actors pursuing individual
interests. The force and reality and presence of institutions as entities in our lives
tends to be denied. And of course there is no way to judge them, except as they
approximate the market.
The attempt to destroy the idea, and value, of institutions can extend even to
governmental institutions. This can be seen in the attempts of some "public choice"
theorists to treat legislation as if it were always merely a deal between competing
interest groups, and never shaped by higher or more general considerations. See,
e.g., Easterbrook, The Supreme Court, 1983 Term-Foreword: The Court and the
Economic System, 98 HARv. L. REv. 4 (1984). But see Macey, Promoting PublicRegarding Legislation Through Statutory Interpretation:An Interest-Group Model,
86 COLUM. L. REv. 223 (1986).
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you should seek to satisfy, that no distinction can be drawn between
the beautiful and ugly, the wise and foolish, and so on. It is to
confirm a vulgar view of democracy that makes the preference or
will supreme, as if we functioned by instant referendum. It erases
the sense that a democracy is a mode of communal self-constitution
and self-education that may have higher ends than the satisfaction of
wants, namely the creation of a community of a certain sort, at once
based upon a set of responsibilities and offering us a set of opportunities for civic and social action.
E.

The Only Possibility?

What other kinds of economy, and of economic analysis, would
be possible? The usual thing is to think of Marxism as the only
alternative. It is obviously true that Marx offers a critical and creative
intelligence of enormous power, but the kind of "Marxism" claimed
by certain antidemocratic totalitarian states obviously offers no relief.
In fact, in certain respects-I think of Marx's attitudes towards the
relations between humanity and nature-the
ideology of such eco28
nomics rather closely parallels our own.
But there are other human possibilities as well. Here, for example,
is E. F. Schumacher's brief description of Buddhist economic life as
practiced in Burma:
The Buddhist point of view takes the function of work to be at
least threefold: to give a man a chance to utilize and develop his
faculties; to enable him to overcome his ego-centeredness by joining
with other people in a common task; and to bring forth the goods
and services needed for a becoming existence ....

[T]he conse-

quences that flow from this view are endless. To organize work in
such a manner that it becomes meaningless, boring, stultifying, or
nerve-racking for the worker would be little short of criminal; it
would indicate a greater concern with goods than with people, an
evil lack of compassion and a soul-destroying degree of attachment
to the most primitive side of this worldly existence. Equally, to
strive for leisure as an alternative to work would be considered a
complete misunderstanding of one of the basic truths of human
existence, namely that work and leisure are complementary parts of
the same living process and cannot be separated without destroying
the joy of work and the bliss of leisure ....

It is clear, therefore,

that Buddhist economics must be very different from the economics

28.

See ISAAC l?. BALBUS, MARXISM

AND DOMINATION

(1982). On the other

hand Marx is always interested in the meaning of economic activity for the actors,
in the power relations built into the forms of economic life, and in the problem of
cultural criticism. For a helpful attempt to look at our own economic ideology from

a point of view that might be described as eclectically Marxist, see
BRONER, Tm NATURE AND LOGIC OF CAPITALISM

(1985).

ROBERT
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of modern materialism, since the Buddhist sees the essence of
civilization not in a multiplication of wants but in the purification
of human character. Character, at the same time, is formed primarily by a man's work. And work, properly conducted in conditions of human dignity and freedom, blesses those who do it and
equally their products.
While the materialist is mainly interested in goods, the Buddhist is
mainly interested in liberation. But Buddhism is "The Middle Way"
and therefore in no way antagonistic to physical well-being. It is
not wealth that stands in the way of liberation but the attachment
to wealth; not the enjoyment of pleasurable things but the craving
for them. The keynote of Buddhist economics, therefore, is simplicity and non-violence. From an economist's point of view, the marvel
of the Buddhist way of life is the utter rationality of its patternamazingly small means leading to extraordinarily satisfactory results.
For the modern economist this is very difficult to understand.
He is used to measuring the "standard of living" by the amount of
annual consumption, assuming all the time that a man who consumes more is "better off" than a man who consumes less. A
Buddhist economist would consider this approach excessively irrational: since consumption is merely a means to human well-being,
the aim should be to obtain
the maximum of well-being with the
29
minimum of consumption.
I am not now concerned with the question whether this is an accurate
description of Burmese attitudes, but with the helplessness of modern
economic language before patterns of this kind. Here we have described for us a life based upon desire not for objects or resources,
for which there is competition and a market, but for meanings and
relations. The "good" or excellence of life desired is not in principle
limited in quantity; its "scarcity" is not to be reduced by increased
production or managed by market exchanges, but must be dealt with
by each person as he faces the limits of his mind and circumstances,
alone or with others.

The language of neoclassical microeconomics is not a universal
language of descriptive analysis, let alone of judgment, but is deeply
rooted in the practices of a capitalist industrial and commercial
economy. Much of its plausibility derives from the fact that the
assumptions it makes about human behavior and reasoning fit rather
well with the acquisitive values and calculating rationality of the
economic sphere of our own larger culture. If one approves those

29. SCHUMACHER, supra note 1, at 54-58. I owe this reference to Alton
Becker. Compare MARSHALL SAHuNS, STONE AGE ECONOmiCS (1972).
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aspects of our culture and wishes to extend them, as many do, there
is perhaps no difficulty with this; but if one wishes to think about
whether or not to approve them, this kind of economics does not
afford a language in which to do so, since it is by its very premises
committed to them. There is thus a double relation between this
method of economic analysis and our larger culture: the dissemination
of this way of talking tends to confirm attitudes and conduct that
conform to it, the prevalence of which are in turn taken to confirm
the rightness of the method-all on the assumption that the premises
of our own economy are built into the nature of humanity. In this
sense the "politics" of this kind of economic discourse is directly
continuous with politics of another, more obvious kind.
VII.

CONTROLLING THE DISCOURSE

What has happened in this thought-experiment is that I have
asked you to begin to think about economics as a total culture, about
what it would mean to make one feature of our shared existence,
namely economic exchange, the dominant metaphor for all of our
shared existence. For me at least the results are impossible. I have
described economics as a political system and as an economic system.
A full account would go further and describe it as a psychological
system,30 a religious system,31 a linguistic system,3 2 a system of high

30. For helpful assistance in thinking about the psychology of this system,
and other social systems too, see DONALD W. WINNICOTT, HOME is WHERE WE
START FROM: ESSAYS BY A PSYCHOANALYST 239-60 (1986), where he argues that
democracy at once depends upon the emotional health and maturity of the citizen
and contributes to those things. An ideology based on consumption, on strategies
for maximizing, on a view of human tastes as of equal value and of their satisfaction
as an unqualified good thing, is hardly a recipe for health and maturity.
31. One object of religion is to draw our attention away from the apparent
meaning of our activities and towards something deeper, towards what in the view
of the religion in question is "really going on" while we lead our daily lives of work
and play. The religion speaks to what can be seen only from a distant point, from
which life can be seen as a whole. It normally does this against our desires to deny
certain features of our lives, especially the fact that we are mortal and that all
object-oriented satisfactions are certain to end in failure. The idea is to bring us
face to face with what we normally deny about our nature and our circumstances,
with the idea of helping us live on those terms, that is to say, more truly. This I
think is true of all religions with which I am at all familiar.
What would happen if one tried to make a religion of, economics? It is true
that the economist wants to penetrate the forms of life to reach a deeper truth, but
economics works in the opposite way from religion, namely to narrow our range of
vision and increase our denials-it denies not only what we repress but also what
we know in our daily lives-with the effect of stimulating or increasing objectoriented behavior.
Similarly, while religious language is typically transcendental-a way of pointing or leading to a mystery in the world or in the self that cannot be described or
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culture and education, a system of reason, and so on. I have not
done that in any detail, but you can perhaps see the lines along
which such analyses would begin.
Fortunately, as I said at the outset, the picture of economics as
a total culture, even apart from any errors of understanding I may
have made, is at most an extrapolation, an exaggerated rendition of
certain implications of economic talk. No economist makes economics
his only language; no one could. It must in the end bear some
reciprocal relation to the rest of the culture, and the question is what
that relation should be.
The economist, as insider, has to ask himself how this language,
to which he is deeply committed, can and should be integrated with
other languages, what other aspects of the culture should be mobilized
and kept alive in his mind and talk. For us as outsiders the question
is both harder and simpler: harder because we know less about the
language, but also simpler, for we are less committed to it. We can
thus regard our main tasks as establishing habits of caution and
circumspection before adopting its modes of thought and expression,
and as learning to insist upon their subordination to the practices of
the larger culture, including the legal culture, of which we are a part.
A.

The Place of Economics

I assume that the language of market economics, properly controlled, can be instructive and useful for the analysis of those activities
that proceed on its assumptions: where there is a market with easy
exit and entry, where the itemization by which the market proceeds
involves no serious denial of complexity, where there are adequate
substitutes for the items exchanged (hence elasticity of supply and
demand), where the motives of the traders are in fact wealth-

reproduced in language, one that is beyond the reach of the "rational" mindeconomics tends to claim not only that everything can be reduced to the power of
reason but that it can be reduced to a very small number of mental functions indeed.
Instead of ennobling humanity by recognizing our every capacity and the limits
beyond, it reduces humanity to a tiny slice of experience and thought. If economics
were a total culture, then, and its language treated as adequate to all occasions, it
would create an anti-religion, turning people away from trying to understand the
meaning of their activities in a larger context, as fundamentally ethical and relational,
and towards a reduced understanding of them, as activities defined in terms of goals
or objects.
This can of course be presented as a kind of hard-headed realism, an aversion
to mushy talk about "meaning" and the like. But here as elsewhere, materialism is
chosen for non-material ends that can themselves be seen and evaluated. Economic
discourse expresses the deep desire to live in a world of objects and instruments, a
world in which human actors compete for acquisition, prestige, and domination.
32. I say something about the economists' view of language at pages 170-72
supra and page 201 infra.
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maximizing, where most or all agree that the relevant values translate
into dollars or some other medium of exchange, where the actors are
more or less equally situated with respect to wealth, competence, and
other constraints, and so on. In such cases the law may sensibly
speak in economic terms; and when the legislature has chosen to do
so, lawyers and judges should accept that judgment. But even here,
where it works best, economics has the political and ethical implications, and some of the economic failings, that I describe above, and
as I shall say more fully below it should be continuously subordinated
to, and perhaps modified by, the discourse that defines our political
and constitutional tradition.
Economics has made real contributions to the law as well, in
teaching us, as Ronald Coase has done, that we should focus our
attention on the degree to which any arrangements we try to impose
may be bargained away, 3 or, as Judge Posner has done, that there
''4
are new ways to think about "negligence" and "strict liability, 1
or, more traditionally, that the actual burden of a tax may fall upon
someone different from the one who pays it in the first instance. I
think the greatest contribution of economics has been to complicate
our sense of our own language, and of the world, by showing us
that other, often paradoxical, formulations are possible. It offers
some of the mischievous pleasure of disturbing settled views. As one
voice among many, one way of claiming meaning among many, it
thus has a place in the legal process even outside the economic zone.
But this is a far cry from speaking of all transactions as if they
were exchanges, or offering the language of market-economics as our
central social metaphor, or conceiving of the world upon which the
law works in such terms.
The point of my remarks is not that the market, or its study,
should be abolished, but that both should be subordinated to the
values and practices of our larger culture.35 When I look at our
country I see a community of great virtue and strength, as well as
considerable vice and weakness; when I look at economics I see a
language that is deeply inadequate for talking about what is best in
our shared existence; indeed, I think it is destructive of it. The
greatest achievements of our country have in my view been legal and

33.
34.

1986).

See Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. LAW & ECON. 1 (1960).
See RicHARD POSNER, THE ECONoIc ANALYSIS OF LAW 160-65 (3d ed.

35. I should perhaps also add that I am not at all opposed to the continuation
of our market economy, especially by comparison with its polar opposite, the
centrally planned bureaucratic one. But I favor it on pragmatic, not dogmatic
grounds-there is no better alternative; it provides some source of power to resist
the excesses of centralized government-and I certainly do not regard its results as
entitled to any special veneration or respect if they seem, as they often do, on
independent grounds to be undesirable.
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political, not economic. It is not upon the fact that we have so much
wealth that our claims to respect and self-respect should rest, but
upon the fact that we have, or have had, a new kind of politics, a
new set of relations among the citizens and between the citizens and
their government. Our object should not be to achieve maximum
"growth" but to try to insure that each human being is able to
realize his or her potential for a meaningful life in community with
others. Ours should be an "economy" that has as its central value
the meaning of our individual and collective activities and relations,
not the production and consumption of goods and services.
B. A Problem of Writing
I have said that economics should be integrated with, and in
important respects subordinated to, the rest of our culture, to the
rest of what we know and value. But how, and with what effects, is
this to be done?
The forces against which we must work are powerful ones, for
the conversion of theory into ideology, the movement from a set of
obviously false assumptions to a picture of our social world thought
to be true, is a natural process-anyone tends to universalize his
language and its assumptions-and one that it is hard to resist,
perhaps impossible to resist completely. But I think I know where in
the effort we should focus our attention, and that is on the attitude
we have towards the language we are using. The conversion of theory
into ideology works by a literary process, and I think the most
important method of resistance for economists and others alike is
literary too: it is to keep alive the recognition that not everything
can be said in economic terms, that there are other languages, other
cultures, with which it must have a relation, and to which it should
on many occasions submit.
This is not just a matter of saying, "Oh, yes I know all that,"
and proceeding as usual. Sensitivity to the political and ethical
significance of the discourse, and to its intellectual limitations, if it
is real, will show up not merely in appendices or prolegomena but
also in our actual writing and talking. This means that the discourse
itself will inevitably undergo transformation of kinds now impossible
to foresee. Not only, then, are those of us who stand in the general
culture wise ourselves to resist the imperialism of economics; we can
properly insist as well that in speaking to us the economist integrate
what he knows as an economist with what he knows in the rest of
life, and reflect this knowledge in his talk about the nature of our
community and its future. I am not trying to suggest that economists
should stop their trade-far from it-but that they should become
something else as well, rhetorical and cultural critics of their
own discourse. When they do, I believe they will find ways to
harmonize more fully the ways in which they conceive of the world
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as economists and the other ways in which people act and talk.
Even if my account of the sort of economic thought with which
I have been concerned is erroneous, or misleading, or unduly alarmist,
there remains at least this to say, of which I am sure: whatever its
merits, the language and practice of economics cannot be justified in
its own terms. Whoever is to think and speak seriously about this
matter must in the end turn to some other discourse, some other
language, than economics. When that happens one necessarily affirms
a view of self and language for which economics itself is insufficient.
This is to take the single step I think most essential, to begin to
think in more than one language, more than one voice, and thus to
locate the particular practices of a discourse in the larger context of
the rest of what we know and are.
To put my point even more strongly: when the economist speaks
to us he is acting not as an economic actor himself, engaging in
arms-length exchanges designed to increase his utility, but as one
mind speaking to another, seeking to persuade to particular conclusions, to a language, to a view of life. He speaks as a person asking
to believed. He is engaged, that is, in the rhetorical and communal
practices of conversation, in which he asks to be listened to as one
who seeks the truth, and these are activities for the description and
criticism of which his own language as an economist is wholly
inadequate.
C.

The Culture of the Law

I think that one especially important "other culture" is the law;
and that it is critically important that law not collapse, as it is so
earnestly invited to do, into the economic mode of thought that
operates on such different premises. Indeed, I think that law might
well serve as a model for judgment in the economic field, rather than
the other way around.
How is law different? To give an account of the law and its
methods has been the major aim of my other work, and here I can
be no more than sketchily suggestive. But some distinguishing features
of legal discourse, in its ideal form, are that it assumes an equality
of actors and speakers, not of dollars; that it provides a set of
speaking-places where real differences of view and interest can be
defined and addressed; that the language of law is not self-applying
but leaves room for argument both ways; that it is continuous with
ordinary language and politics, and thus necessarily respects the
culture it acts upon and out of; that its methods of reasoning are
not linear but multidimensional; that its conversations take place
among a plurality of voices; and that it is inherently idealizing, taking
as its constant subject what we ought to do, who we ought to be.
What the law insists upon is that we are a discoursing community,
committed to talking with each other about our differences of per-
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ception, feeling, and value, our differences of language and experience. The task of law is to provide a place and a set of institutions
and methods where this conversational process can go on, as well as
a second conversation by which the first is criticized and judged. In
law, political power is divided up among separate actors under
circumstances requiring that they talk to each other. It thus creates
an occasion and necessity for deliberative and institutional politics, a
method of collective thought, that is in principle wholly different
from the expression of want or desire in the instant referendum of
the market. This process is not reducible to the metaphor of exchange,
to a conception of humanity as consisting of self-interested atoms
trading at arm's length, or to a view of the institution-or "firm"as such a trade set up on a permanent basis. Institutions are part of
the culture that makes us what we are; they provide talking-places
of special kinds and a kind of collective memory too. The method
for the analysis of this process is rhetorical, the standards ethical and
political and cultural: Who are we to each other? How do we address
our differences in language and situation? How can we best bring
our inherited resources to bear upon this case or this situation, and
in so doing affirm and transform them?
The discipline of economics, by contrast, is single-voiced, and in
the legal context tends to reduce all questions to the single dimension
of policy. As a "policy" discipline economics cannot take over the
law without destroying certain of its essential features: its multivocality, its attitude toward limits and ignorance, and its sense of
the authoritative.16 "Policy" arguments, including those based on
economics, are important to law but they are not all of it. In our

36. To reduce law to policy, that is, whether of the old-fashioned liberal or
neoclassical economic or some other kind, is to cut through the complexity and
reality of legal thought, at the center of which lies fidelity to judgments made by
others. This point has in the past been well and repeatedly made in opposing the
view that the judiciary should regard themselves primarily as policy-makers; it can
be made again with at least equal force in the present context.
One can put it this way: To ask, "What policy should we follow?" is to pose
a question that lawyers and judges must address, but it is not the distinctive legal
question. That question is, "How should this case, under this set of authoritative
texts, be decided?" Of course this question raises what are called policy issues, and
with those issues economics and the other policy sciences can be helpful, as can
other forms of discourse altogether, based upon intuition, for example, or a sense
of character or fundamental value. The lawyer's task, and the judge's too, is to
bring to bear upon the case the whole range of available languages, testing them
against each other, on the understanding that one is to be continuously faithful to
those sources of authority, external to the self and to the present moment, that are
expressed in the texts that define the law. The force of economic discourse, at its
most extreme, is to destroy the law and replace it with something else.
For an elegant discussion of the central place of the authoritative in our
conception of law, see JOSEPH VINING, THE AUTHORITATIVE AND THE AuTIolrrAmuAN
(1986).
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practice they are located in a complex context of competing arguments, cast in other terms. Much of the meaning of law lies in the
tension it creates among various ways of speaking; one of its great
tasks is to locate policy discourse, including economics, in a context
that cannot be accounted for in its terms.
The difference between law and economics is perhaps most sharp
on the central matter I have been addressing, the attitude towards
one's own language and world. This I think can be posed as a
question of attitude towards translation and translatability. Economics goes most seriously off the rails when its practitioners assume
that everything can be said in its terms, that it is an adequate language
for constructing the central metaphors of our social life. This is to
speak as if one's language is transparent or conceptual, and has no
force of its own. What is real to such a speaker are the objects in
the world and the people who desire those objects and struggle with
each other, one way or another, to obtain them. The function of
language is to represent this world. Language has no independent
social or cultural or political reality. It is simply a transparent system
for identifying the actors and those objects in the world that are the
objects of desire or disdain, or for pointing towards the concepts,3 7
existing above or beyond language itself, that create the mathematical
entity called an economy. The language of economics is thus assumed
to be a super-language, or an authoritative meta-language, in two
dimensions: it describes the world the only way the world can be
described; and it creates a set of conceptual structures which, if they
meet the test of economics themselves, are the only accurate conceptual structures for thinking about the world. Everything that is real
can be said in, or translated into, this language.
The other attitude to have towards language, including one's own
-I call it a literary view, though many physicists and biologists
would recognize it too-is that all languages are limited; that none
says the whole truth; that full translation from one to the other is
always in a deep sense impossible. This means that the most profound
obligation of each of us in using his or her language is to try to
recognize what it leaves out, to point to the silence that surrounds it
-to acknowledge the terrible incompleteness of all speech, and thus
to leave oneself open to hearing other truths, in other languages. At
its best the law does this, or strives to do so, for it is a constant

37. Legal language has conceptual elements too, but the tendency of the law
to become a purely conceptual system is systematically undercut by the pressures of

the particular case, by the recognition that our terms can (and will) be perpetually
redefined, and by the knowledge that each case has two sides. The law is a system
for the change of language as well as its application.
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linguistic competition. How to characterize the facts and the law,
how to conceive of and feel about the case, and what, therefore, to
do about it, are the central questions of a legal hearing. The lawyer
knows that her categories are those of argument and judgment, not
simple factual description. The terms of her language itself are always
arguable. The legal conversation must therefore proceed, if it is to
proceed well, with a kind of structural tentativeness about itself. The
law, at its best, is a system of translation that acknowledges its own
inadequacies. It should listen to economics, regarding it as one
language, one set of metaphors, among many, and be willing to use
it when appropriate and with appropriate qualifications. But the last
thing it should do is turn itself over to this other culture, working
on such different linguistic, social, and political principles.
To return to the most general version of my question and ask by
what central metaphors we should conceive of our world, our motives
and our relations, I think we should turn to the traditional constitutional conception of humankind living in a natural world beyond
our full comprehension, bound together by law, the first principle of
which is the equal value of each human being, and under a set of
governments that democracy aims to make communities as well. We
can conceive of human beings as living in time, in cultural and social
contexts; as growing from childhood to maturity; as having children
of their own; as people with a variety of languages and voices; and
we can do so with a sense of the limits of their minds and ours. We
can conceive of the material universe as fundamentally organic and
we can acknowledge our dependence, economically and otherwise,
upon it. Law, as we have traditionally conceived and practiced itas a rhetorical and cultural activity, as an art of language and of
life-has been based upon such a view of human life. It has the
great merit of drawing our attention constantly to the limits of our
own point of view, of our own language, and towards the unknown
merits of another. We should not abandon it.

